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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 




Control No.: 08-024-18 B 
Appearances: Joanne L. Best, Esq. 
Orleans Co. Public Defender 
1 S. Main St., Ste. 5 
Albion, New York 14411 
Decision appealed: July 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18-months. 
Board Member(s) Coppola, Drake, Demosthenes 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief.received December 7, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
Fi The undersigned detennine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ Vacat~d, remanded for de novo interview __ Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separa:e din~s of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on r ~ 't.; 17 66' 
! L'.~:·1hil1i,m: ·\pre~tb I :'nit - .-\pp<.:llan1 - Appellant's CoLin~d - Inst. Purnk File - Central i:ik 
' :-t•i('di.' I 11 20ISf 
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Appellant challenges the July 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, excessive, and irrational, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and did not 
provide sufficient weight to Appellant’s programming, letters of support, remorse and release 
plans; (2) the Board did not have Appellant’s entire file before it at the time of the interview; (3) 
the use of teleconferencing technology to conduct parole release interviews is improper; (4) the 
18-month hold was excessive; and (5) the COMPAS instrument contained erroneous information. 
As to the first issue, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
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must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
  
            It is neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Board to consider Appellant’s remorse relative 
to his crime of conviction. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); 
Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d 
Dept. 2018) (minimization of crimes); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 
N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018) (limited expression of remorse); Matter of Crawford v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (lack of insight and failure 
to accept responsibility), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 
A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007) (limited insight and remorse); Matter of 
Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002) 
(limited insight into why crime committed).  Remorse is relevant not only to rehabilitative progress 
but also to whether release would deprecate the severity of the offense.  Matter of Phillips v. 
Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 125 (1st Dept. 2007).  Inasmuch as Appellant 
disputes the Board’s finding with respect to his remorse, it was well within the Board’s authority 
to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 
108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).   
            As to the second issue, there is no evidence that the Board did not have Appellant’s entire 
file before it at the time of the interview.  Furthermore, Appellant did not raise this issue during 
the interview. 
            As to the third issue, the use of teleconferencing technology to conduct parole release 
interviews is permissible.  It does not prejudice the inmate and is consistent with the requirement 
that a parole candidate be “personally interviewed.”  Matter of Webb v. Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 
810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Mack v Travis, 283 A.D.2d 700, 723 N.Y.S.2d 905 
(3d Dept. 2001); Matter of Vanier v. Travis, 274 A.D.2d 797, 711 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dept. 2000); 
see also Yourdon v. Johnson, No. 01-CV-0812ESC, 2006 WL 2811710, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 
28, 2006); Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d 431, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
  As to the fourth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
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604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 18 months was not excessive or improper. 
As to the fifth issue, Appellant’s issues relating to substance abuse were discussed during 
the interview.  The panel discussed Appellant’s substance abuse history, and scores relating to 
substance abuse contained in the COMPAS instrument, and these discussions were taken into 
consideration by the Board when making its determination.  
  
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
